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Leaders "[flrom producer Norman Lear to the president," are complaining of a lack of spirituality in American public life.1 Religious references
and symbols are being systematically purged as religious influence is privatized. The few school texts which do include religion treat it as being "at the
lunatic fringe of American society." 2 By the time children are in second
* J.D., University of Florida; M.A., Old Dominion University (1984); B.A., Texas Christian University
(1978).
1. Howard Fineman, God and the Grass Roots, NEwswEEK, Nov. 8, 1993, at 42, 43-44.
2. Jeffrey L Pasley, Not-So-Good Books: Whatever Happened to Squanto, THE NEW REPUBUC, Apr.
27, 1987, at 20, 20 (describing how school texts virtually ignore the role of religion in the founding of the
181
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grade, they "know that God is illegal."3 Former Education Secretary William
Bennett suggested that the Supreme Court has contributed to this perception
with a First Amendment jurisprudence which has "failed to reflect sufficiently on the relationship between our faith and our political order."4 Yet religion remains an enduring feature of American life.'
One of the most controversial, potentially divisive, and frequently litigated constitutional issues in the latter half of this century is the reach of the
First Amendment's religion clauses.6 At issue is the value of religion and its
place in American public life.7 Many of the cases reaching the Supreme
Court over the past three decades have pitted the free exercise claims of one
party against a government entity, which defended by claiming that accommodation would be an impermissible establishment of religion." Court decisions are usually close, often split 5-4.9 And at the heart of the controversy
is the Court's interpretation of the First Amendment."°

United States and social reform movements such as abolition, the early women's movement, and the civil
rights movement of the 1960s).
3. Nancy Gibbs, America's Holy War, TIME, Dec. 9, 1991, at 60, 66 (describing legal debate over
the role of religion, especially as applied to the public schools). The article reports that one teacher ordered students to strike the word "God" from a textbook, explaining that reference to God in public school
was illegal. Id at 61.
4. William Bennett, Speech to the Supreme Council of the Knights of Columbus (Aug. 7, 1985),
quoted in David Wagner, Bill Bennett's Dilemma, NAT'L REV., June 19, 1987, at 28, 30.
5. GARRY WILLS, UNDER GOD: RELIGION AND AMERICAN PoITIcs 16 (1990); Steven D. Smith, The
Rise and Fall of Religious Freedom in ConstitutionalDiscourse, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 149, 172-76 (1991)
(both texts citing poll data to show the pervasiveness of religious belief among the population).
6. "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof .. " U.S. CONST. amend. I. The amendment is usually viewed as having two distinct, and
often conflicting, clauses: one barring an establishment of religion, the other guaranteeing free exercise.
See infra notes 46-51 and accompanying text.
7. Rex E. Lee, The Religion Clauses: Problems and Prospects, 1986 B.Y.U. L. REv. 337, 337. The
initial controversy over government's role and the place of religion occurred with the passage of the Constitution. Several states had established religions at that time; citizens of those states and members of
minority religious groups were concerned that the new federal government would declare a national religion. As a condition of ratification of the Constitution, these states demanded a bill of rights. Michael W.
McConnell, The Origins and Historical Understandingof Free Exercise of Religion, 103 HARV. L. REV.

1409, 1440 (1990).
8. See, e.g., Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist., 113 S. Ct. 2462 (1993) (holding that the Establishment Clause does not bar placement of a public employee, a sign language interpreter, in a sectarian
school. Petitioners argued that the denial of a govemment benefit violated the Free Exercise Clause);
Board of Educ. v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226 (1986) (holding that the Equal Access Act granting voluntary,
student-initiated religious organizations access to secondary school facilities on the same basis as the other
extra-curricular activities did not violate the Establishment Clause); Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707
(1981) (holding that denial of unemployment benefits violated petitioner's right to free exercise of his religion, and that accommodation would not involve the state in fostering a religion in violation of the Establishment Clause).
9. A.E. Dick Howard, Pendulum Swung Widely in 15-Year Period,NAT'L LJ., Nov. 29, 1993, at 59.
10. Michael M. Maddigan, The Establishment Clause, Civil Religion, and the Public Church, 81 CAL.
L. REv. 293, 294-97 (1993). "Which test is applied in a given case depends on the fact pattern and on
which Justice writes the majority opinion." Id at 297.

MARGINALI7JNG RELIGION

This issue is particularly sensitive in light of the pluralistic nature of the

religious landscape: Americans subscribe to as many as 1500 different religious sects and denominations," and an individual's religious belief is often
the central core of that individual's world view." The pervasiveness of governmental administrative regulation overlays the field. 3 As government assumed increasing responsibility for social issues such as education and poverty relief, which were formerly the purview of the church, religion has been
forced into an increasingly private role. 4 The prevailing view insists that
religion 5must withdraw wherever the ever-expanding reach of government
extends.

The debate over the role of religion has become particularly heated because substantial segments of the American public believe that society is
embroiled in a cultural war. 6 Each side of the debate---secularist and traditional religionist-has become so militant and deeply entrenched that neither
is willing to listen to the other. 7 Yet the collective life of a society requires
some common and generally accepted moral and legal standards in order for
the culture of that society to survive. "[What is ultimately at stake is the
ability to define the rules by which moral conflict ... is to be resolved."' 9
The Supreme Court, called upon to preserve the rights of believers of all
faiths and to define appropriate church-state relations, aggravated the tension
by developing a separate jurisprudence for each of the two religion provi-

11. Kenneth L. Woodward, The Rites of Americans, NEWSWEEK, Nov. 29, 1993, at 80, 80; see also
JAMES DAVISON HUNTER, CULTURE WARS: THE STRUGGLE TO DEFINE AMERICA 67-77 (1991) (describing
the growth of religious pluralism).
12. Mark Fischer, The Sacred and the Secular: An Examination of the "Wall of Separation" and Its
Impact on the Religious World View, 54 U. Prrr. L. REv. 325, 341 (1992) ("If one cannot see how religion 'fits in,' one's religion can become a hobby or an ethnic label--like being Italian"); see also Smith,
supra note 5, at 176 (stating that those who learn to separate their religious convictions from legal discussions become "culturally disembodied").
13. County of Allegheny v. ACLU Greater Pittsburgh Chapter, 492 U.S. 573, 657-58 (1989) (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part). Justice Kennedy noted that:
In this century. as the modem administrative state expands to touch the lives of its citizens
in such diverse ways and redirects their financial choices through programs of its own, it is
difficult to maintain the fiction that requiring government to avoid all assistance to religion
can in fairness be viewed as serving the goal of neutrality.
Id
14. HAROLD J. BERMAN, FATrH AND ORDER: THE RECONCILIATION OF LAW AND RELGION 226-34
(1993); see also Maddigan, supra note 10, at 302, 317.
15. Richard John Neuhaus, Contendingfor the Future: Overcoming the Pfefferian Inversion, 8 J.L. &
REL. 115, 121 (1990); see also Michael W. McConnell, Religious Freedom at a Crossroads 59 C1. L.
REV. 115, 134 (1992).
16. See generally HUNTER, supra note 11.
17. CHARLES COLSON, KINGDOMS IN CONFLICT 62 (1987); Charles Krauthammer, America's Holy
War, THE NEW REPUBLIC, Apr. 9, 1984, at 15, 16.
18. HuNT, supra note 11, at 323.
19. Id; see also JAMES HrICHCOCK, WHAT Is SECULAR HUMANISM? 17 (1982) (the "ultimate stakes
are nothing less than the moral foundations of society").
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sions: interpreting free exercise as a "preferred freedom" while interpreting
the establishment
clause as erecting a "high wall separating church and
'2 °
state."
In part I, this article briefly discusses the history of First Amendment
religion clause interpretation. Part II describes the modern jurisprudence of
each provision separately, and the Court-created conflict between the mandates of free exercise and the prohibitions of establishment. Part Ell illustrates
the uncertainty generated by the Court's inability or unwillingness to articulate a coherent theory of the amendment's meaning and the practical effects
of modem Court decisions. Finally, part IV examines the effect on society:
religious influence has been marginalized in American public life, and as a
result the moral base of the law has been undermined. This article concludes
in part V by suggesting what several of the Justices themselves, as well as
numerous commentators, have recommended: the Court should formulate a
workable standard which accommodates the religious scruples of our
pluralistic society.
I. HISTORIC INTERPRETATIONS OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT RELIGION
CLAUSE(S)

Constitutional and legal scholars are concerned with the "founding moment" and the views of the founders in ways that puzzle historians." As
one scholar explains, this is because the founders were concerned with establishing a social order; and in an "unsettling parallel" with modern society,

they were facing a very real potential for social anarchy.' Further, interpretation of constitutional provisions, or laws in general, should generally reflect
the view of reality and intentions which informed the laws' drafters, unless
those assumptions are clearly rejected or shown to be invalid.'
It is only appropriate, then, that the Court frequently traces the history of
the religion clauses in an effort to shed light on the framers' intent.' "No
provision of the Constitution is more closely tied to or given content by its

20.

J. Woodford Howard, Jr., The Robe and the Cloth: The Supreme Court and Religion in the United

States, 7 J.L. & POL. 481, 497 (1991). Free exercise was enumerated among the preferred freedoms in
Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105, 115 (1943). Jefferson's wall-of-separation became a "high wall"
in Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 18 (1947).
21. ROBERT A. BURT, TiE CONSTITUTION iNCoNFuCr 36 (1992).
22. Id.
The potential for anarchy is inherent in the democratic ideals of popular sovereignty and selfdetermination, as will be discussed further in part IV, infra notes 275-312 and accompanying texL
23. Maddigan supra note 10, at 296. See generally LON L.FULLER. ANATOMY OF THE LAW 58-60
(1968) (stating that laws are made and interpreted within the context and assumptions of the culture to
which they are meant to apply).
24. See, e.g., Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 674 (1984) (citing an "unbroken history of official
acknowledgment ...of the role of religion in American life" to permit a public creche display); Marsh v.
Chambers, 463 U.S. 783 -(1983) (citing historic practice to uphold legislative prayer); Walz v. Tax
Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664 (1970) (citing historic practice to uphold tax exemptions for churches).
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generating history than the religion clause of the First Amendment."' However, the Court routinely ignores legislative history.' Often, the Court cites
to the writings of Madison and Jefferson for authority; yet their views on
religious liberty were not the same, nor do they necessarily reflect the understanding of those who drafted and ratified the amendment. Rarely does
this exercise resolve the question presented, and the Court is often criticized
for inaccurate historical analysis.'
Justice Joseph Story discussed the difficulty of drawing the limit "to
which government may rightfully go in fostering and encouraging religion."" According to Story, there were three levels of government "encouragement": aid to one religion, leaving people free to adopt any other; an
ecclesiastical establishment, with freedom to adopt other religions; or an
establishment which excludes non-adherents from participation in the state?
Leveling all religions, holding all in "utter indifference," was not a viable
option;3 and support of the Christian religion was distinguished from forcing the consciences of men or punishing them for worshipping differently.'
To Story, the objective of the religion clause of the First Amendment
was to "exclude all rivalry among Christian sects, and to prevent any national ecclesiastical establishment" which would have the "exclusive patronage"
of the national government.33 Story's interpretation of the First Amendment
religion clause is consistent with the'writings and actions of the founders.
For example, some of the delegates expressed concern at the Article VI's
religion test ban in the Constitution - they feared that "pagans, papists, and
Mahometans"' might be elected to office, and that "Popery and the Inquisition might be established in America."'3 Public religious exercises, even by

Everson, 330 U.S. at 33 (Rutledge, J., dissenting).
See, e.g., Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 92-99 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); DANIEL
DREISBACH, REAL THREAT AND MERE SHADOW: RELIGIOUS LIBERTY AND THE FrRST AMENDMENT 57-66,
102-05 (1987).
27. McConnell, supra note 7, at 1449-55 (describing the debates in the first Congress, the free exercise provisions of each of the state constitutions, and contrasting Jefferson and Madison's views of religion); DRIESBACH, supra note 26, at 107-58 (comparing Jefferson and Madison's views, also noting that
their positions were not consistent throughout their lives); Howard, supra note 20, at 486-87 (contrasting
Jefferson and Madison's views on the scope of religious exemptions and views of religion in general).
28. See, e.g., DREISBACH, supra note 26, at 48-49; A.E. Dick Howard, The Supreme Court and the Establishment of Religion, in JAMES MADISON ON RELIGIOUS LIBERTY 288 (Robert S. Alley ed., 1985).
29. 3 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES § 987 (1833).
30. Id.
31. 1& § 988.
32. Id. § 990.
33. Id.§ 991.
34. STEPHEN L CARTER, THE CULTURE OF DISBELIEF 86 (1993) (quoting HENRY ABBOTr, 4 THE DE25.
26.

BATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF TH]E FEDERAL CONSTITUTION (Jon-

athan Elliott ed., 1988)); see also ROBERT T. Mn.LER & RONALD B. FLOWERS, TOWARD BENEVOLEN
NEUTRALITY: CHURCH, STATE, AND THE SUPREME COURT 3 (3d ed. 1987).
35. MILLER & FLOWERS, supra note 34.
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government officials, were also acceptable to the drafters of the amendment:
contemporaneously with passage of the First Amendment, Congress authorized congressional chaplains and passed a resolution calling for a national
day of thanksgiving and prayer.'
Thus Justice Story's interpretation is a more accurate reflection of the
actual intent of the drafters and ratifiers of the First Amendment. This same
premise would also guide Court decisions for over one hundred and fifty
years. Citing to examples in history and previous court decisions, Justice
Brewer in Church of the Holy Trinity v. United State?"declared, "this is a
Christian nation."3" He was not saying that Christianity was established by
the government, but that the religious and moral beliefs of the American
people, and the foundation of the legal system, were overwhelmingly Chris39

tian.

Of course, the religious landscape is significantly more pluralistic than in
Justice Story or Justice Brewer's day; yet Justice Douglas, writing for the
Court in Zorach v. Clauson," reflected this same premise when he stated
"We are a religious people whose institutions presuppose a Supreme Being.'' Justice Douglas tempered the holding that the separation of church
and state must be "complete and unequivocal" 2 by noting that this separation is not all-encompassing. If it were, religion and the state "would be
aliens to each other - hostile, suspicious, and even unfriendly. 4 3 Discussing the requirements of government neutrality, the Court found no requirement for government to be hostile to religion and to "throw its weight
against efforts to widen the effective scope of religious influence."
Yet the modern courts have "thrown their weight" against not only efforts to widen the scope of religious influence, but even against some longstanding traditions. In an effort to enforce government neutrality, the Court
has rendered the Free Exercise Clause almost meaningless,45 and created an

36.
37.

DREmSEACH, supra note 26, at 66-68.
143 U.S. 457 (1892).

38. Id. at 471 (describing the view of American life as expressed in the laws, businesses, customs, and
society, from the European foundations through the present time, as a religious society).
39. Thomas C. Atwood, Through a Glass Darkly, POL. REV., Fall 1990, at 44, 59 ("Most 19th-century
Americans viewed a Christian 'state' as an indirect result of a Christian people or nation, not the other
way around."); see also 1 ALEXIS DE TocQuEviLL, DEMOCRACY INAMERICA 317 (Phillips Bradley ed.,
1945) (1835) ("Americans combine the notions of Christianity and of liberty so intimately in their minds
that it is impossible to make them conceive the one without the other".); HUNTER, supra note 11, at 8 (the
cultural heritage is Christian, but Christianity is not institutionalized).
40. 343 U.S. 306 (1952).
41.

Id. at 313.

42. Id. at 312.
43.

Id.

44.

Id. at 313.

45. See, e.g., Douglas Laycock, The Remnants of Free Exercise, 1990 Sup. CT. REv. 1. 4 (as a result
of the Smith decision. "the Free Exercise Clause itself now has little independent substantive content");
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unworkable standard to test for an establishment.' I submit that a strict
separationist approach to church-state issues by its nature favors non-religion
over religion. Any public display of religion or religious motives for a government official's action, including laws accommodating constituents' beliefs,
is suspect. The Court has warned against such a result several times since
Zorach,7 yet continues to reach inconsistent results.

One potential source of the current confusion of interpretation is the
modern conventional wisdom that there are two separate religion clauses
which must be balanced." The Court and most scholars have treated free
exercise and non-establishment as two separate, stand-alone clauses only
since the landmark decision in Everson v. Board of Education.'9 Most agree
that whether interpreted as one clause or two, the original purpose of the
provisions was to secure religious liberty.'e However, the treatment of the
"no-establishment clause in isolation" has led to a situation where the Court
is focused on preventing an establishment while free exercise is undervalued
and underprotected.5t This has resulted in the courts carving from the Estab-

John T. Noonan, The End of Free Exercise, 42 DEPAUL L. REv. 567, 576 (1992) ("Free exercise is an
illusion. The decisions of the Supreme Court show that it is an illusion."); Stephen L. Pepper, The Conundrum of the Free Exercise Clause-Some Reflections on Recent Cases, 9 N. KY. L. REV. 265, 294 (1982)

(arguing that equal protection-like neutrality renders the Free Exercise Clause "functionally meaningless").
46. In his separate opinion in last term's Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist.,
113 S. Ct. 2141, 2149 (1993), Justice Scalia agreed with "the long list of constitutional scholars who have
criticized Lemon and bemoaned the strange Establishment Clause geometry of crooked lines and wavering
shapes its intermittent use has produced." Id. at 2150 (citations omitted). Justice Scalia noted that six of
the Justices had at various times called for Lemon's repudiation. I.
47. For example, while concurring with the Schempp decision, Justice Goldberg warned the Court of
becoming preoccupied with the secular at the expense of religion:
mhe attitude of government must be one of neutrality. But untutored devotion to the concept of neutrality can lead to invocation or approval of results which partake not simply of

that noninterference and noninvolvement with the religious which the Constitution commands, but of a brooding and pervasive devotion to the secular and a passive, or even
active, hostility to the religious. Such results are not only not compelled by the Constitution, but,. .. are prohibited by it.
School Dist. of Abington Township v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 306 (1963) (Goldberg, J., concurring).
Justice Kennedy issued a similar warning more recently in County of Allegheny v. American Civil Liber-

ties Union Greater Pittsburgh Chapter, 492 U.S. 573, 657 (1989) (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment
in part and dissenting in part) ("Any approach less sensitive to our heritage would border on latent hostility toward religion, as it would require the government in all its multifaceted roles to acknowledge only the
secular, to the... exclusion and so to the detriment of the religious.").
48. Neuhaus, supra note 15, at 115-16.
49. 330 U.S. 1 (1947).

50. See, e.g., Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 68 (1985) (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment);
Ira C. Lupu, Reconstructing the EstablishmentClause: The Case Against DiscretionaryAccommodation of
Religion, 140 U. PA. L. REv. 555, 558 (1991) ("Taken together, the clauses are most persuasively con-

strued as mandating a regime of equal religious liberty.").
51. Edward McGlynn Gaffney, Jr., Hostility to Religion, American Style, 42 DEPAUL L. REV. 263,
301-03 (1992).
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lishment Clause a "zone of permissible accommodation."'52 The intended
result (free exercise) has thus become "subordinated to the means (non-establishment)"53 where the latter is given decisional priority.
II. MODERN INTERPRETATION OF THE CLAUSES
The starting point for any examination of modem religion clause jurisprudence is Reynolds v. United States.' The first of several cases involving
the free exercise claims of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints
(Mormon), the Reynolds Court established the First Amendment jurisprudential principles which control today.5 Among those principles are the beliefaction dichotomy and the "wall of separation" doctrine. The dichotomy
leaves believers free to believe as they choose, but the government is equally
free to regulate any action which may flow from that belief.' The impact of
this 7 ruling becomes apparent as modem society becomes ever more regulated.

5

A. Free Exercise

The Court's widely-criticized decision' in Employment Division v.
Smith" returned to the Reynolds rational basis analysis of free exercise exemptions for religiously-motivated conduct.' For a brief period, announced

initially in Braunfeld v. Brown6 and expanded in Sherbert v. Verner,6 the

Court had employed a strict scrutiny examination. The Sherbert Court formulated a two-step analysis which required the individual claiming infringement
to demonstrate that the law as applied burdened her free exercise of religion;
once the burden threshold had been crossed, the state was required to show a

52.
53.
54.

LAURENCE TRIBE, AMERICAN CoNSTrITUIoNAL LAw § 14-7, at 1194 (2d ed. 1988).
Neuhaus, supra note 15, at 116.
98 U.S. 145 (1878).

55. Employment Div. v. Smith. 494 U.S. 872, 882 (1990) (holding that the rule established in
Reynolds controls).
56. Reynolds, 98 U.S. at 166.
57. Ia C. Lupu, Models of Church-State Interaction and the Strategy of the Religion Clauses, 42
DEPAut. L. REv. 223, 226 (1992).

58. See, e.g., Laycock, supra note 45, at 3 (describing the Court's use of precedent as "transparently
dishonest"); Michael W. McConnell, Free Exercise Revisionism and the Smith Decision, 57 U. CHL L.
REv. 1109, 1125 (1990) (the precedent which the majority relied on "consists entirely of overruled and
minority opinions"); William P. Marshall, In Defense of Smith and Free Exercise Revisionism, 58 U. CHI.

L REv. 308, 309 (1991) (opinion showed a "shallow understanding of free exercise jurisprudence," and
the Court's use of precedent "borders on fiction").
59. 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
60. Id.at 885.
61. 366 U.S. 599 (1961) (upholding Sunday closing laws despite the burden on Jewish merchants who
were compelled by religious doctrine to also close on Saturday).
62. 374 U.S. 398 (1963) (holding that an individual cannot be denied government benefits if a condition for receipt of those benefits forces the individual to compromise tenets of her religious faith).
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compelling interest in the general application of the law.'
In rejecting the Sherbert analysis, the Smith Court reasoned that the
compelling interest test, which in other fields of constitutional law produces
"equality of treatment and an unrestricted flow of contending speech,"
would produce "a private right to ignore generally applicable laws" if applied to religious free exercise. Justice Scalia, writing for the majority, characterized the former as "constitutional norms," the latter a "constitutional
anomaly."' Yet only a year before, Justice Scalia had premised his dissent
on the "discriminatory protection of freedom of religion in the Constitution."
In actual practice, the compelling interest test has not resulted in an
expansion of religious liberty." In most cases, either the burden on free exercise as presented by the believer did not rise to the threshold, or more frequently, the Court found that the state's interest was sufficiently compelling
to override it.' In November 1993, President Clinton signed the Religious
Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) into law, overturning by legislation that
portion of Smith which reduced the standard of review.70 It remains to be
seen whether RFRA will have any practical effect on Court decisions due to
the high threshold of burden for the believer and the low level of interest the
Court has considered to be "compelling" for the state. Ironically, while restoring the compelling interest test by statute, RFRA codified another unfortunate result of Smith-the guarantee of free exercise as a legislative grant
instead of as a specifically enumerated right. This is a result a previous Court
had resoundingly denounced.7'

63. Id. at 403 (burden); id. at 406 (compelling state interest).
64. Smith, 494 U.S. at 886.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Texas Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock, 489 U.S. 1, 30 (1989) (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia found
no constitutional basis for the Court's decision which struck down the "longstanding and widespread practice" of exempting religious publications from sales tax. Id at 33.
68. Noonan, supra note 45, at 576 (postulating that free exercise is a Potemkin village). One attorney
who specializes in church-state cases has not argued free exercise for his clients since approximately 1986;
instead he frames the issue as free speech or freedom of association. Jay Alan Sekulow, Address at the
Christian Legal Society Annual Conference, workshop on church-state issues (Oct. 16, 1993).
69. See generally Ira C. Lupu, Where Rights Begin: The Problem of Burdens on the Free Exercise of
Religion. 102 HARv. L. REV. 933 (1989). See also TRIBE, supra note 52 (noting that the Court has
"placed significant hurdles in the way of free exercise claimants"); Pepper, supra note 43, at 302 (noting
that the Court infrequently accepts Free Exercise cases, and has failed to articulate coherent criteria for
those exemptions it does grant).
70. Peter Steinfels, Clinton Signs Law Protecting Religious Practices,N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 16, 1993, at
A18.
71. West Virginia Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 638 (1943):
The very purpose of a Bill of Rights was to withdraw certain subjects from the vicissitudes
of political controversy, to place them beyond the reach of majorities and officials and to
establish them as legal principles to be applied by the courts. One's right to life, liberty,
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B. Establishment
The first case in which the Court considered the Establishment Clause as
a stand-alone provision was the landmark case of Everson v. Board of Education.2 At issue was a New Jersey provision which reimbursed parents for
bus fare costs of sending their children to school; some of the parents receiving refunds sent their children to parochial schools. The Court drew on the
same line of reasoning which had informed the Reynolds Court-Jefferson's
"wall of separation" metaphor. In sweeping language, the Court announced
the limits which the Establishment Clause placed on the states."' But the
Court also reasoned that because the plan provided the neutral benefit of safe
transportation, New Jersey's reimbursement scheme survived scrutiny.74
As one commentator noted, the Court began the "historical distortion of
the Establishment Clause" by claiming that the establishment clause "was
intended to erect a 'wall of separation between church and state.' " Considering that several of the states had established churches at the time the
Bill of Rights was ratified, and that the First Amendment was in part designed to protect those establishments," such an intention by the ratifiers
was improbable." The historic analysis employed by the Everson Court has
been criticized by subsequent Court opinions and numerous commentaries.'
The historical approach and invocation of the wall metaphor proved
inadequate to meet the challenges to various practices under the Establishment Clause. The Court therefore combined the criteria developed over the
years to devise a three-part test in Lemon v. Kurtzman.79 The consolidated
cases in Lemon involved aid to parochial schools in two states; Pennsylvania
provided reimbursement to the schools for teacher salaries, textbooks, and instructional material in secular subjects, while Rhode Island authorized supplemental pay for nonpublic school teachers after finding that education

and property, to free speech, a free press, freedom of worship and assembly, and other

fundamental rights may not be submitted to vote; they depend on the outcome of no elections.
Id.

72. 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
73. Id.
at 15-16.
74. Id. at 18.
75. Fischer, supra note 12, at 330-31 (quoting Everson, 330 U.S. at 16) (emphasis Fischer).
76. Jesse H. Choper, The Religion Clauses of the First Amendment: Reconciling the Conflict, 41 U.
Prrr. L. REv. 673, 676 (1980).
77. Actions of the founders such as appropriating funds for religious schools, chaplains, and other
religious activities, also would tend to indicate that they did not mean the Establishment Clause to forbid
all aid to religion as the Everson Court held. 330 U.S. at 15-16; see, e.g. Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38,
100-02(1985); Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 788 (1983); BERMAN, supra note 14, at 229-30.
78. See, e.g., Wallace, 472 U.S. at 92-99 (Rehnquist, J.,dissenting); DRIESBACH, supra note 26, at
159-64; Fischer, supra note 12, at 330-34.
79. 403 U.S. 602, 612 (1971).
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quality was jeopardized by low salaries.s'
The test for constitutionality which emerged from Lemon is that a statute
(1) must have a secular legislative purpose; (2) its primary effect must not
advance or inhibit religion; and (3) it must not foster "an excessive government entanglement with religion."'" The Lemon Court noted that a "total
separation between church and state" is not possible, and that some interaction is inevitable. 2 The line of separation, "far from being a 'wall,' is a
blurred, indistinct, and variable barriere'' to be determined by the specific
facts of the case. However, the mere "potential for impermissible fostering of
religion"" was sufficient to violate the Establishment Clause.
C. The Conflict of Interpretations

Justice Stewart, in his concurring opinion in Sherbert, predicted that
there would be "many situations where legitimate claims under the Free
Exercise Clause will run into head-on collision with the Court's insensitive
and sterile construction of the Establishment Clause."" Sherbert itself was
such a case: the state conditioned the receipt of unemployment benefits on
the applicant's willingness to violate a tenet of her faith (Sabbath worship).
Mrs. Sherbert was dismissed from her job when her employer changed to a
six-day work-week; she was denied unemployment benefits when she refused
similar jobs which also required a Saturday work schedule." The Court noted that the condition violated her right to freely exercise her religion, yet
Establishment Clause jurisprudence "must inevitably lead to a diametrically
opposite result."'
The values inherent in the two religion clauses (and the free press clause)
came into conflict more recently in Texas Monthly v. Bullock,s a case involving tax exemptions for religious publications. Justice Blackmun highlighted the conflict by observing Free Exercise "suggests that a special exemption for religious books is required [while the] Establishment Clause
suggests [it] is forbidden.""9 Justice Blackmun noted that both the majority
and the dissenting opinions resolved the conflict by subordinating the values
80. 14 at 606-07. Rhode Island's Act also required that teachers applying for a salary supplement,
must agree in writing not to teach courses in religion. ld.
at 608.
81. Id.
at 612-13.
82. Id.
at 614.
83. Id.
84. Id at 619.
85. Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 414 (Stewart, J., concurring in the result). Justice Stewart characterized the
Court's approach to the Establishment Clause as "positively wooden," while its approach to Free Exercise

showed a "distressing insensitivity." Id
86.
87.
88.
89.

Id at 399-400.
Id
489 U.S. 1 (1989).
Id at 27 (Blackmun. J., concurring in the judgment).
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of one clause to the other.' While he would prefer to decide the case without sacrificing one clause, Justice Blackmun ultimately determined that a
"preference for the dissemination of religious ideas... is constitutionally
'
intolerable."91
In Sherbert, the conflict was resolved in favor of free exercise. More
often the result is subordination of free exercise to the fear of establishment,
as in Texas Monthly. "In requiring government impartiality respecting religion, the rule [religion-blindness] produces results hostile to religion without
serving nonestablishment values and... subvert[s] [the] historical and contemporary aims of the Establishment Clause." These conflicting interpretations downgrade the positive value that both religion clauses assign to religious liberty by prohibiting solely religious exemptions from general regulations no matter how great the burden to religion, or how unsubstantial the
state interest.93

M. THE EFFECTS

OF MODERN INTERPRETATION

A. Uncertain Application

As a result of the Supreme Court's inconsistent rulings, lower courts and
public officials are left with confused guidance as to what level of recognition or accommodation of religiously-motivated action is permitted. Some
members of the Court have acknowledged the problem they have created for
the lower courts. In the words of Justice Scalia, "[olur cases interpreting and
applying the purpose test have made such a maze of the Establishment
Clause that even the most conscientious governmental officials can only
guess what motives will be held unconstitutional."' Former Solicitor General Rex Lee was more succinct: "The law's a mess."'
A district court decision in one of the many creche cases highlighted the

contradictions. Commenting on the wall metaphor, the court noted that in
bricklaying, misplaced bricks "produce an irregular, asymmetrical, and possibly structurally unsound wall." The ironic result is that the government
has declared the annual celebration of the birth of Christ a national holiday,
but "may now participate in the celebration of that holiday only in ways
which deny its meaning."97

90. 1i
91. 1d. at 27-28.
92.

Choper, supra note 76, at 688.

93. Id.
94. Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 636 (1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
95. This statement is quoted in Richard N. Ostling, Threatening the Wall: Church-State Separation
Has Powerfid New Critics, TIME, July 6, 1987, at 70, 70.

96. American Jewish Congress v. City of Chicago, 1986 WL 20750 *5 (N.D. IMI.1986).
97. 1
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The Lemon test is the source of much of this confusion. Each prong of
the test has its critics. For example, the "purpose" prong does not distinguish
between advancing religion and advancing religious liberty." Thus, as will
be discussed in the next subsection, an accommodation of religious practice
can be interpreted as an establishment. The Court itself has recognized that
its "entanglement" prong sets up a "Catch-22" situation: in order to ensure
that government funds are not being used to advance religion, the government must monitor the program or religious institution in a way that constitutes excessive entanglement."
In a concurrence to the plurality opinion in Wolman v. Walter,"°° Justice Powell noted the positive contributions of sectarian schools, and commented that at this point in our nation's history, "we are quite far removed
from the dangers that prompted the Framers to include the Establishment
Clause in the Bill of Rights.'' ° If, as the Wolman Court claimed, the risk
of "religious denominational control over our democratic processes""ec is so
remote, one must question why neutral, generally available education services-such as textbooks, teaching aids, and disability services-are often not
available to children whose parents exercise a choice to send them to religious schools. 3
One reason is the general suspicion with which religion has come to be
viewed by those in leadership and judicial positions. The Court's strict
separationist approach leads many to challenge programs which are neutral in
their distribution if some of the beneficiaries happen to be religious. This
was the situation when New York enacted legislation to provide textbooks to
all primary and secondary students, regardless of what school they attended."30 Although the Supreme Court upheld the law, Justice Black's virulent
dissent is informative: "[Tihe same powerful sectarian religious propagandists
who have succeeded in securing passage of the present law ... can and
doubtless will continue their propaganda, looking toward complete domina-

98. McConmell, supra note 15, at 129.
99. Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589, 615 (1988). The entangling aspect of monitoring is the downfall of many programs which involve schools as well. See, e.g., Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402 (1985);
Grand Rapids Sch. Dist. v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373 (1985); see also McConnell, supra note 15, at 118-19.
100. 433 U.S. 229 (1977).
101. d. at 263 (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
102. ld

103. Freedom to choose religious schools is constitutionally recognized, but it is glib to say that parents
have a choice if it is not economically feasible--"Freedom of speech, freedom of the press, freedom of
religion are available to all, not merely to those who can pay their own way." School Dist. of Abington
Township v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 313 (1963). (Stewart, J., dissenting). For a succinct discussion of the
Court's contradictory results in this area, see McConnell, supra note 15, at 119-20.
104. Board of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236 (1967) (holding that a program which distributed texts for
secular subjects such as math and history was neutrally administered and of general benefit to all school
children, and therefore was not an establishment of religion).
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tion and supremacy of their particular brand of religion.""°
The same suspicion can also lead to devastating results. In Aguilar v.
Felton,'" the Court struck down a program to provide remedial education
services to children of low-income families because some of the services
were provided by public school employees in religious schools." 7 Using the
child-benefit theory, Congress had specified that this program was to be open
to all needy children, regardless of the school they attended." The majority was concerned that public school educators in a religious school setting
would have a tendency to slip religious indoctrination into remedial math and
English classes, and therefore would require close monitoring.Y As the
dissent noted, there was no evidence of any such illicit activity, "' and the
effect of the decision was to deny desperately needed remedial teaching services to economically disadvantaged children."'
B. When Accommodation Is an Establishment

Under a Lemon analysis, an act of the legislature which would accommodate a religious practice would by definition violate the Establishment
Clause. Since Lemon requires that the act must have a valid secular purpose
which does not advance or inhibit religion, "2 a legislative accommodation
would by definition clearly violate the first two prongs of the test. Reductio
ad absurdum, even the Free Exercise Clause, which favors an advancement
of religion, would violate the Lemon test. 3 Yet under Smith, a legislative
accommodation is precisely the solution the Court leaves to believers."4
A statute enacted specifically to accommodate the religious beliefs of the
jurisdiction's constituents would fail the Lemon test because it either has a
religious purpose or advances religion. Thus, while Sunday closing statutes
were held to be constitutional," 5 and workers discharged for refusing to
work on their Sabbath could not be constitutionally denied unemployment
benefits 1 6 a Connecticut statute which directed employers to excuse employees on their particular day of worship was held unconstitutional."" The
Court in Estate of Thornton v. Caldor,Inc. found that the statute, which had

105. ld. at 251 (Black. J., dissenting).
106. 473 U.S. 402 (1985).
107. Id.
108. Lee, supra note 7. at 344-46.
109. Aguilar, 473 U.S. at 408-14.
110. Id. at 424 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
111. Id. at 419 (Burger, CJ.. dissenting).
112. 403 U.S. at 612.
113. Fischer, supra note 12, at 340.
114. 494 U.S. at 890.
115. Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599 (1961); McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961).
116. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
117. Estate of Thornton v. Caldor, 472 U.S. 703 (1985).
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been enacted when the Sunday closing law was repealed as an accommodation to workers of all religious faiths, impermissibly advanced a particular
religious practice." 8
Similarly, several lower courts have dismissed free exercise claims when
the state defended on the ground that its compelling state interest was to
avoid establishing a religion. In Bender v. Williamsport Area School District,"9 students challenged the school district's refusal to permit a studentinitiated, nondenominational prayer group to meet during the school's activity period.'2 The students alleged infringement of their rights of both free
exercise of religion and free speech. 2 ' The district court had granted summary judgment in favor of the students, but the Third Circuit reversed, holding that while the students had a free speech right to engage in religious
activity, to allow such activity would violate the Establishment Clause."
C. The Secular State and the Heckler's Veto
Cases decided under the First Amendment's Free Speech Clause have
indicated that the speaker has the right to speak, regardless of the offense it
may cause his audience, unless the speech amounts to "fighting words."'"
Government or the police have an affirmative duty to protect the speaker's
right of expression over that of the audience not to be offended.'" The
Court held in Cohen v. California that the "presence of unwitting listeners or
viewers does not... justify curtailing all speech capable of giving offense."'" It is the responsibility of the audience to "avert their eyes" if the
speech offends."a Similarly, both the Illinois Supreme Court and the Seventh Circuit refused to enjoin the American Nazi Party from marching in a
predominantly Jewish town, holding that anticipation of a hostile audience is
not justification for prior restraint.'

118. Id. at 705 & n.2, 710.
119. 741 F.2d 538 (3d Cir. 1984), rev'd on other grounds, 475 U.S. 534 (1986).
120. Id. at 541.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 557, 559 (analyzing the student's claims under the Free Speech clause only).
123. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942).
124. Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989). In this flag-burning case, the Court held that "government
may not prohibit the expression of an idea simply because society finds the idea itself offensive or disagreeable." Id at 414.
125. Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 21 (1971).
126. Id.
127. Village of Skokie v. National Socialist Party of Am., 373 N.E.2d 21 (l. 1978) (holding that the
swastika is a symbolic form of speech and cannot be enjoined under the fighting words exception, nor is
anticipation of hostile audience justification for prior restraint). In the parallel case, three village ordinanc-

es which would have effectively prohibited the march were held unconstitutional. The ordinances (1)
prohibited dissemination of materials promoting hatred on the basis of heritage, (the court held that a

march permit could not be denied on the basis of anticipated ordinance violations); (2) prohibited military
style uniform during assembly; (3) required group to obtain liability insurance of at least $300,000 (the
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Religious speech or expression is not afforded this same level of protection. Any public offering or display of religious information or symbolism
may be subject to the heckler's veto. Professor Phillip Johnson noted that
people routinely listen to things they do not agree with, except in a religious
context. "People have to listen to the most heavy-handed dogmatism. Then
suddenly the Constitution is violated if an agnostic hears the word God. This
is absurd."'" The courts encourage some of this divisive conflict over religious speech and symbolism by offering to remedy the complaints of those
29
offended.
Speech, symbols and expression which have religious significance are
thus the frequent targets of court challenge. "The urge-indeed, lust-to
interfere with the 'wrong' thoughts and speech of others is often manifested
in anti-religious zealotry."" ° The Establishment Clause interpretation which
bans support or preference to any religion or all religions "is taken by some
fierce secularists to justify assaults on certain religious expression that is not
prohibited by the Establishment Clause." '' Relying on the concept of separation of church and state, secularists have attempted to build "a wall between religion and society. Creches and crosses in public places threaten no
one, but they make adherents of the new secular orthodoxy uncomfortable."' 32 Indeed, the effort to disqualify the religious voice from the public
square is seen by at least one commentator as an effort to "privilege a particular... range of conceptions of rationality"' 33 and thus is not an affirmation of neutral or impartial principles.
In one of several lawsuits over city seals, an atheist sued the city of
Austin, Texas, saying that the cross in the city's insignia offended him."
Austin's seal survived scrutiny because the cross was part of the city
founder's family crest.'35 Other cities' seals, which also included symbols
which reflect their town heritage, were found unconstitutional when religious
symbology was considered too pervasive, or too visible when enlarged on the
city police vehicles." The American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) often

court held that an insurance requirement could not be used to prohibit the demonstration). Collin v. Smith
578 F.2d 1197 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 916 (1978).
128. This statement is quoted in Gibbs, supra note 3, at 63-64.
129.

Phillip E. Johnson, Concepts and Compromise in FirstAmendment Religious Doctrine, 72 CAL. L.

REV. 817, 831 (1984).
130.

NAT HENTOFF, FREE SPEECH FOR ME-BuT Nor FOR THEE 10 (1992).

131.

d.

132.

Irving Kristol, Christmas, Christians,and Jews. NAT'L REv., Dec. 30, 1988, at 26.

133. Michael J. Perry, Comment on "The Limits of Rationality and the Place of Religious Conviction:
ProtectingAnimals and the Environment," 27 WM. & MARY L. REv. 1067, 1068 (1986).
134.

Murray v. City of Austin, 947 F.2d 147, 150 (5th Cir. 1991). This particular suit failed because

the cross was part of city founder Steven F. Austin's family coat of arms; it was the coat of arms, rather
than the cross itself, which was made the city seal. Id. at 158.

135.
136.

I at 158.
Harris v. City of Zion, 927 F.2d 1401 (7th Cir. 1991); Friedman v. Board of County Comm'rs,
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weighs in with the plaintiffs in these cases. In the ACLU's interpretation, the
First Amendment forbids not only the establishment of a particular national
church, but also "excludes virtually all religion from public life."' 37 As a
result, the place of religion in American life has been reduced, and religious
speech has been restricted in a way the ACLU would never allow other
forms of speech to be.'38
D. Privatized and Watered-down Religion
Court decisions seem to favor the view that religion is best kept out of
sight. The Lemon Court declared that "religion must be a private matter for
the individual, the family, and the institutions of private choice."' 39 The
Second Circuit used similar language in Brandon v. GuilderlandBoard of
Education to ban voluntary student prayer meetings."4 Although the students did not desire faculty supervision or involvement, the court determined
that faculty surveillance would be necessary to ensure that the meetings were
truly voluntary. 4' The Brandon court found that the Lemon test would be
doubly violated by granting the students' request: permission would
impermissibly advance religion, and the faculty surveillance would be excessive entanglement.42

In response to situations like Brandon, Congress passed the Equal Access
Act. 43 The Act's constitutionality was challenged and upheld in Board of
Education v. Mergens.'" The Court considered the legislative history, and
found that the Act was "intended to address perceived widespread discrimi-

781 F.2d 777 (10th Cir. 1985).
137. Richard Vigilante & Susan Vigilante, Taking Liberties: The ACLU Straysfrom Its Mission, POL'Y
REv., Fall 1984, at 28, 28.
138. Id.
139. 403 U.S. at 625.
140. 635 F.2d 971, 973 (2d Cir. 1980).
141. Id. at 973-74. The court was concerned that a student might "perceive 'voluntary' school prayer in
a different light if he were to see the captain of the school's football team, the student body president, or
the leading actress in a dramatic production participating in communal prayer meetings .
"/,
I.." at 978.
The Fifth Circuit borrowed this language from Brandon to strike down a Texas school district's equal
access policy, Lubbock Civil Liberties Union v. Lubbock Indep. Sch. Dist., 669 F.2d 1038, 1046-47 (5th
Cir. 1982), prompting the dissent on rehearing to question the court's neutrality toward religion. 680 F.2d
424, 426 (5th Cir. 1982) ("Is neutrality still the objective or is it the fashion now to make the state the
adversary of religious belief?... mhe young student may also be given the impression that our government and the courts and the schools are hostile to all religious belief and practice .
.
142. 635 F.2d at 794.
143. 20 U.S.C. §§ 4071-4074. The Act provides that it is unlawful for public secondary schools which
receive federal funds, and which provide a limited public forum, to deny equal access or otherwise discriminate against student groups on the basis of the content of speech, including religious speech, at their
meetings. Id. § 4071(a). A limited public forum is open whenever a school has "one or more
noncurriculum related student groups" which meet on school premises during noninstruction time. Id §
4071(b).
144. 496 U.S. 226 (1990).
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nation against religious speech in public schools."' 45 Voluntary student religious groups could meet pursuant to the terms of the Act, but the Court expressly declined to rule on the First Amendment question.'" Despite an Act
of Congress and the Mergens decision, students continue to find school administrators hostile to any voluntary, student-initiated religious activity. 4
Many of the cases which affirm the right to a public display of religion
do so only when the religious symbol or art is sufficiently "watered-down"
as to be inoffensive. To accomplish this, courts look at what else is in the
display,'" or how large a percentage of the city seal consists of religious
symbols. Cobb County, Georgia was ordered by the district court to remove
a privately-donated panel display of the Ten Commandments from its courthouse hallway. 49 The order was stayed for four months, however, to allow
the county to place the panel into a larger educational display which "include[s] all the various moral, historical, and political influences on our legal
system."'" The irony of this order is evident when one considers that the
Ten Commandments are etched into the marble in the United States Supreme
Court building, reflecting the law's basis in the decalogue."'
E. Indifference to Religious Sensibilities
In their efforts to enforce neutrality in public fora, courts often fail to
account for the impact their decisions have on religious beliefs. This result is
most vividly illustrated in the cases involving Native American worship
practices and public school textbooks and curricula. Courts show little concern that the decisions may undermine or, in extreme cases, destroy the religious beliefs or practices of a people.
In Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, the Association
invoked the American Indian Religious Freedom Act (AIRFA) 52 to chal-

145. Id. at 239.
146. Id at 247.
147. Following the Mergens decision, the Westside School District considered abolishing all extracurricular groups so as to not allow the Bible Club to meet. Bridget Mayhew's Desire for a Bible Club in
School Redrew the Boundary Between Church and State, PEOPLE, June 25, 1990 at 67. The American
Center for Law and Justice, a religious liberties organization, litigated over 65 equal access cases in 1993.
Sekulow, supra note 68.
148. Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668 (1984); Doe v. Small, 934 F.2d 743 (7th Cir. 1990).
149. Harvey v. Cobb County, 811 F. Supp. 669 (N.D. Ga. 1993). Standing was granted to plaintiff
Harvey because he saw the offending display on each of the half-dozen times per year he entered the
courthouse. Id. at 674. But see Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 21 (1971) (the Court held that the offended viewer had to avert his eyes).
150. Harvey, 811 F. Supp. at 678-79.
151. Lynch, 465 U.S. at 677.
152. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1996 (Law. Co-op. 1989). The statute, enacted in August 1978, declared that it was

the policy of the United States to preserve and protect Native American religious freedom, which included
the right to believe and exercise their religions through traditional ceremonies and rites, and to have access
to sites and possession of sacred objects.
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lenge a logging road over federal land which also was sacred worship
grounds for three Native American tribes. 3 Although a United States Forest Service environmental impact study concluded that the road would cause
"serious and irreparable" damage to the Native American's religious practice,
the Court held that government actions could not be conditioned by religious
objection." The majority cautioned against reading the opinion as an encouragement to government insensitivity toward citizens' religious needs;
however, the Court also determined that because AIRFA was policy only, it
was meaningless."
Indifference to religious sensibilities is frequently evident in school cases.
In Mozert v. Hawkins County Board of Education, seven families objected to
a reader series which they claimed taught values contrary to their sincerely
held religious beliefs."' The district court found that the school board had
required that the students read material offensive to their religious beliefs or
give up their free public education. 58 The Sixth Circuit determined that because the students were. not required to affirm or declare a belief, they failed
to establish a burden on their religious free exercise.9 Government actions
which "merely offend" or cast doubt on one's religious beliefs do not implicate the First Amendment."W
One area which quite clearly pits religious against secular values is the
teaching of evolution in schools. And in this area, the courts have clearly
favored "irreligion over religion." In Epperson v. Arkansas, 6" the Court
invalidated a statute which prohibited the teaching of evolution. Likewise in
Edwards v. Aguillard," the Court struck down a statute which required
that neither creationism nor evolution be taught separately. Enacted as the
Louisiana Balanced Treatment for Creation-Science and Evolution-Science in
Public School Instruction Act," the state had considered both expert testimony which proffered scientific evidence routinely censored from the
classroom' and Establishment Clause questions in debating the law. The
Court determined that the legislature's stated purpose of protecting academic
freedom was inconsistent with a balanced teaching of evolution and creation;
153. Lyng v. Northwest Indian Protective Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439. 449 (1988).
154. Id. at 442, 449.
155. Id. at 453.
156. Id. at 455.
157. Mozert v. Hawkins County Bd. of Educ., 827 F.2d 1058, 1061 (6th Cir. 1987).
158. Id. at 1062. Note that this is essentially the same choice, conditioning the receipt of a government
benefit on compromise of one's religious principles, which the Sherbert Court found unconstitutional. See
supra notes 62-63 and accompanying text.
159. Mozert, 827 F.2d at 1069, 1070.
160. Id. at 1068.
161. 393 U.S. 97 (1968).
162. 482 U.S. 578 (1987).
163. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 17:286.
164. Edwards, 482 U.S. at 611.
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and that the real purpose was to discredit evolution by teaching creationism,
which the Court said was a religious belief.Ia
Although frequently presented as fact, evolution is an unproven theory of
the origins of life, just as is creationism."a Ignoring record testimony that
creationism could be taught without reference to religion, 67 the Court
found no legitimate state interest in protecting religions from "distasteful"
scientific views."' However, as the dissent pointed out, Establishment
Clause jurisprudence does not require striking a law just because it "happens
to coincide or harmonize with the tenets of some or all religions. ' 6" Nor
are legislators forbidden to act upon their religious convictions. 70 Further,
Lemon disapproves not only of government actions which advance religion,
but also those which inhibit or disapprove of religion. 7' By teaching the
theory of evolution as fact, students are "wrongly taught that science has
proved their religious beliefs false."' 72
Courts for the most part have turned a deaf ear to claims by religious
plaintiffs that public schools are advancing the religion of humanism in violation of the Establishment Clause. 73 The Supreme Court defined secular
humanism as a religion in Torcaso v. Watkins, 74 as did the movement's
founders. " One federal district judge did hold for the plaintiffs in a much
publicized case, and was promptly reversed on appeal." The effect of such
165.

Id. at 582.

166. Id. at 624-25 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (noting that the scientific establishment treats evolution almost
as a religion, and discriminates against creation scientists "so as to prevent evolution's weaknesses from
being exposed"). See generally PHILLIP E. JOHNSON, DARWIN ON TRIAL (1991).

167. Edwards, 482 U.S. at 612 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
168.

Id. at 590-91. But see JOHNSON, supra note 166, at 123-32 (Darwinism has an ideological bias

against religious belief.).
169. 482 U.S. at 615 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia notes that precedent does not justify invalidating government action simply because it happens to coincide with religious belief or even benefits
religion, id., and that in some circumstances government advancement of religion is required by the Free
Exercise Clause. Id. at 617.
170. Id.
171. Id. at 616 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citing Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612 (emphasis added)).
172. Id. at 624 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Ironically, Justice Brennan's majority opinion recognized that the
trust parents placed in the public schools was conditioned on the understanding that religious views would
not be advanced in the classroom which "conflict with the private beliefs of the student and his or her
family." Id at 584. A very real concern to those who favor parental control of education is that the
schools impose a particular worldview which conflicts with, and is often intolerant of, their most cherished
beliefs. Stephen L. Carter, Evolutionism, Creationism, and Treating Religion as a Hobby, 1987 DUKE LJ.

977, 980-83.
173. Edwards, 482 U.S. at 624 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
174. 367 U.S. 488, 495 n.1 (1961).
175. HUMANIST MANIFESTO (1933) (describing the movement as religious humanism based on science).
A year later, one of the movement's founders expressed his desire to see this new faith established since it
was more current and applicable to modern society than traditional theistic religions. JOHN DEwEY, A
COMMON FArnt 84-87 (1934). Not all members agree, however, and some deny the religious element.
Paul Kurtz, The Ethics of Secular Humanism, in SIDNEY HOOK: PHILOSOPHER OF DEMOCRACY AND HU-

MANISM 157-58 (Paul Kurtz ed., 1983).
176. Smith v. Board of Sch. Comm'rs, 655 F. Supp. 939 (S.D. Ala. 1987). rev'd, 827 F.2d 822 (11th
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rulings is that "a crucial aspect of religious freedom can be exercised only by
families wealthy enough to afford private education after paying taxes to
support public schools."'"
F. Hostility to Religious Values
Justice Brennan highlighted the dilemma the Court faces when deciding
whether to allow public accommodation or recognition of religious traditions
in his dissent in Lynch v. Donnelly: "The effect on minority religious groups,
as well as on those who reject all religion, is to convey the message that
their views are not similarly worthy of public recognition nor entitled to
public support."' 78 What Justice Brennan failed to consider is that that same
message is conveyed even more forcefully to those whose symbols and views
are removed from the public arena. An approach which does not permit
recognition and accommodation of the religious heritage in society would
"border on latent hostility toward religion, as it would require government in
all its multifaceted roles to acknowledge only the secular, to the exclusion
and so to the detriment of the religious. ' 't 7 The logical result is that "religion is placed at an artificial and state-created disadvantage. ' ' s°
The First Amendment religion clauses have been interpreted by many in
today's society as guaranteeing freedom from religion rather than freedom of
religion.' Court challenges have been mounted or threatened to enjoin voluntary Bible reading, 8 singing "Silent Night" in a grade school Christmas
assembly, 83 and to block the display of a cross from the smokestack of a
Catholic hospital because some local residents would be offended."' One
student who interned with the American Center for Law and Justice was
initially skeptical of the number and variety of religious freedom violation

Cir 1988).
177. Mary Ann Glendon, Law Communities, and the Religious Freedom Language of the Constitution,
60 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 672, 679 (1992).
178. Lynch, 465 U.S. at 701.
179. County of Allegheny v. American Civil Liberties Union Greater Pittsburgh Chapter, 492 U.S. 573,
657 (1989) (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
180. School Dist. of Abington Township v. Schempp. 374 U.S. 203, 313 (1963) (Stewart, J., dissenting).
181. Vigilante & Vigilante, supra note 137, at 30 (summing up the ACLU position that religion "is a
force so powerful that the Constitution protects us from it."); see also Michael McConnell. Freedomfrom
Religion, THE AMERICAN ENTERPRISE, Jan.-Feb. 1993, at 34, 36-43.
182. Roberts v. Madigan, 921 F.2d 1047 (10th Cir. 1990) (holding that individual Bible reading during
a silent reading period violated the Establishment Clause, also that two books with religious content must
be removed from a classroom library of over 400 titles).
183. Florey v. Sioux Falls Sch. Dist., 619 F.2d 1311 (8th Cir. 1980), (finding that Christmas music
with religious content has been sufficiently assimilated into the culture that its performance does not constitute a religious activity per se) cert. denied, 449 U.S. 987 (1980).
184. Gibbs, supra note 3, at 61.
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complaints the Center claimed to receive-until she saw them for herself.1"
Some legal scholars and commentators argue that the religion clauses
should be interpreted to exclude the religious voice," or recognize the religious voice only "so long as religion does not genuinely threaten to undermine the secular welfare state..'. Yet to exclude religiously-based viewpoints is to effectively disenfranchise all who hold to those views.'" Requiring people to check their most deeply-held beliefs as the price of admission to the public arena results in alienation, 9 or else in living schizophrenically, "bracketing" those beliefs from other parts of their lives." °
To its credit, the Court has not expressly ruled that the religious voice
should be excluded from the public forum. To the contrary, it has acknowledged that the interests of government and religion will inevitably and frequently "intersect, conflict, and combine.''. However, the Court has found
inadmissible purposes or excessive entanglements in mere accommodations.
Edwards could arguably be an example of striking a law because the viewpoint of the legislators coincided with a religious viewpoint."92 The dissent
in Webster v. Reproductive Health Services would hold the Missouri legisla-

tion unconstitutional because the preamble reflects an "unequivocal endorsement of a religious tenet of some ...Christian faiths."'93 Despite the fact

185. Mark O'Keefe, Holy Warriors,ABA STUDENT LAW., Dec. 1993, at 12, 18-19.
186. See, e.g., Steven G. Gey, Why Is Religion Special?: Reconsidering the Accommodation of Religion
Under the Religion Clauses of the First Amendment, 52 U. Pir. L.REv. 75, 174 (1990) (describing religion as "fundamentally incompatible with [the] intellectual cornerstone of the modem democratic state").
The Establishment Clause should be read to reflect secular, relativistic political values, which are incompatible with religious faith. Id. at 79.
187. Kathleen M. Sullivan, Religion and Liberal Democracy, 59 U. CM. L. REV. 195, 201 (1992).
Professor Sullivan recognizes that the free speech guarantee ensures that persons with religious viewpoints
can participate in the public debate. Id. However, the exercise of religious liberty is limited by the bounds
of the "secular public moral order." Id. at 198.
188. Abner S. Greene, The PoliticalBalance of the Religion Clauses, 102 YALE L.J. 1611, 1613 (1993)
(arguing that basing legislation on a source of values "to which some citizens lack access, or to refuse to
base legislation on a source of value that some citizens hold dear, is a significant exclusion that undermines the legitimacy of the government's claim to obedience"); cf Smith, supra note 5, at 179-80 (saying
the idea that controversial beliefs or theories cannot be the basis of discussion "has little force outside the
specific domain of religious belief," indeed such reliance "is not only common, but inevitable").
189. RICHARD JoHN NEUHAUS, THE NAKED PUBuC SQUARE: RELIGION AND DEMOCRACY INAMERICA
28 (1984).
190. CARTER, supra note 34, at 56; MICHAEL J.PERRY, MoRALrrY, POLITICS AND LAW 72-73 (1988);
see also William P. Marshall, The Other Side of Religion, 44 HASTINGS LJ.843, 845 (1993) (listing three
arguments against restricting the religious voice: (1) it is artificial if not impossible; (2) it undercuts
society's ability to make informed moral and political decisions; and (3) it creates an inappropriate dichotomy which forces religion to be marginalized in a way that devalues religion's role in the life of both the
individual and society). Professor Marshall nonetheless argues for restraints on religion in the political arena. Id. at 854.
191. Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 69 (1985) (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment).
192. 482 U.S. at 615 (Sclia, J.,
dissenting).
193. Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490, 566-67 (1989) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (noting that the view that life begins at conception reflects some but not all Christian faiths, but focusing
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that some sixty-seven religious groups submitted amicus briefs on both sides
of the Webster controversy, Justice Stevens focused on the coincidence of the
Catholic church's pro-life stance with that of the legislature.'" A proposed
California sex education curriculum was successfully challenged in the legislature on the ground that teaching that monogamous heterosexual sex within

marriage was a "traditional American value" was an unconstitutional establishment of religion.'"
IV. SOCIETAL EFFECTS OF MARGINALIZED RELIGION

A. Legislating Morality

Coincident with the Supreme Court decisions in the 1960s limiting religious influence in public schools and elsewhere in public life,'6 a series of
social movements challenged the moral structure and traditions of American
society. The rally cry of the period was "If it feels good, do it."'" God was
proclaimed dead, or at least irrelevant, as had occurred during previous social
movements since the Enlightenment of the 1780s."9 Religion's influence
on social norms and behavior weakened."9 Nevertheless, most policy debates continue to have moral overtones.' With the growth of pluralism
and increasing doubt about traditional religious and cultural values, there is a
growing tendency for law to be used as the expression and carrier of
society's shared values.2°
A major premise of both positivism and the American Legal Realism
movement, that morality and law were distinct entities,' was apparently

primarily on the coincidence with the Catholic position).
194. Robert J. Araujo, A Dialogue Between the Church and Caesar: A Contemporary Interpretation of
the Religion Clauses, 34 B.C. L. REv. 493, 498-99 (1993).
195. Nat Hentoff, The Enemy Within the ACLU, WASH. POST, Nov. 27, 1988, at D7.

196. See, e.g., Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962) (holding prayer in public schools unconstitutional);
School Dist. of Abington Township v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963) (holding Bible reading in public
schools unconstitutional); Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968) (holding that taxpayers have standing to
bring suit challenging government programs only if those programs result in some benefit to religion or

religious institutions). Several studies indicate that the 1960s marked a cultural turning point. See infra
notes 295-97 and accompanying text.
197.
198.

This proclamation was made from bumper stickers popular during the 1970s.
MICHAEL HARRINGTON, THE POLITICS AT GOD'S FUNERAL 12-34 (1983) (discussing the various

social and philosophic movements which proclaimed God dead or irrelevant).
199. Barbara Dafoe Whitehead, Dan Quayle Was Right, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Apr. 1993, at 47, 49.
200. KENNETH D. WALD, RELIGION AND PoLIrTcs IN THE UNTED STATES 243 (2d ed. 1992); GEORGE
F. WILL, STATECRAFr AS SouLCRAFr: WHAT GOVERNMENT DOES 84-85 (1983); Kenneth L. Woodward
& David Gates, How the Bible Made America, NEwSwEEK, Dec. 27, 1982, at 44, 51; HARRINGTON, supra
note 198, at 218.
201. MARY ANN GLENDON, RIGHTS TALK: THE IMPOVERISHMENT OF POLmCAL DISCOURSE 3 (1991).
202. Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REv. 457, 458-69 (1897); see also
H.L.A. Hart, Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals, 71 HARV. L. REV. 593, 612-15 (1958).
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accepted by a substantial body of the population.' The late Justice
Holmes, a prominent proponent of this distinction, denounced "the confusion
between legal and moral ideas."' While noting that legal language was
full of such moral concepts as duty, Justice Holmes suggested that it would
be better if "every word of moral significance could be banished from the
law altogether."' Holmes proposed this separation as an analytical model,
and apparently never considered the idea that this language had an effect
outside the legal community, an effect which would become more significant
over time.'
Justice Holmes' distinction manifested itself in the popular debate over
policy issues in the retort that "you can't legislate morality." Yet as former
Supreme Court nominee Robert Bork noted, "we legislate little else."'
The goal of achieving "neutral" or "impartial" public policy and law in a
morally pluralistic society is futile .' The question is not whether moral
values will be enacted into law, but whose moral values will prevail.' A
moral judgment is directly related to the question of whether an activity
should be prohibited by law.21 0 Yet American jurists have become uncomfortable with the idea that the law has any role in "forming or reinforcing a
common moral sense...' This discomfort is largely attributable to legal
education which for much of the twentieth century has stressed the distinction between law and morality."
The problem arises, then, when the moral values of the majority of
Americans are excluded from the debate because they are religiously
based. 3 To some extent, this is an extension of the content-based discrimination discussed in Part El. 2"" The rise of the "religious right" and other
church-based political movements in the late 1970s was in large measure a

203.
204.
model
205.
206.

GLENDON, supra note 201, at 87.
Holmes, supra note 202, at 458-59. Justice Holmes continued on to discuss his famous "bad man"
as the means of knowing the law. Id
Id at 464.
GLENDON, supra note 201, at 87.

207.

ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL SEDUCTIoN OF THE LAW 246

(1990).
208. PERRY, supra note 190, at 55-56 ("[o]ur law and politics simply cannot be neutral or impartial
among the differences that constitute the dissensus").
209. COLSON, supra note 17, at 428 (emphasis added).
210. LON L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW 7 (1964).
211. GLENDON, supra note 201, at 85.
212. Id Law schools have "promoted the notions that morality was essentially arbitrary and unknowable; and that law and morality were not only distinguishable, but entirely separable." Id; cf PERRY, supra note 190. It is difficult to find moral skeptics except in American law schools. Perry defines moral
skepticism as an outdated moral view, which holds that there cannot be moral knowledge because moral
claims do not have truth value. Id at 9-10.
213. CARTER, supra note 34, at 8-9; MCCoNNEI L. supra note 15, at 144. NEUHAUS, supra note 189, at
81.
214. See supra notes 123-38 and accompanying text.
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defensive reaction to the perception of being "kicked out" of the public
square.21 A pervasive contradiction became evident between culture and
politics: "We insist that we are a democratic society, yet we have in recent
decades systematically excluded from policy consideration the operative
values of the American people, values that are overwhelmingly grounded in
religious belief."2"'
B. The Need for a Moral Base
Justice Stewart stated that he was "convinced that no liberty is more
essential to the continued vitality of the free society which our Constitution
guarantees than is the religious liberty protected by the Free Exercise
Clause." ' 7 In this statement, he was echoing the Founding Fathers who
considered religion to be the foundation of civil society. In Memorial and
Remonstrance, Madison defined religion as "the duty which we owe to our
Creator."2 ' He continued to state that this duty precedes the claims of civil
society, and that before anyone may be "considered as a member of Civil
Society, he must be considered as a subject of the Governour of the Universe. 2

9

Jefferson, who generally reduced a religion to its morality, like-

wise emphasized society's need for morality based on belief in God, citing
the teachings of Jesus as the best example: "The practice of morality being

necessary for the well-being of society, our Creator has taken care to impress
its precepts.., indelibly on our hearts."'

A society is not just a community of political ideas, but a community
with ideals about the way members should behave and govern their lives. "
"A healthy society needs a view of itself as a political and moral
community." m Much legislation, then, is about moral choices because it is
concerned with enacting laws which will regulate, prohibit, or require behavior which will over time enforce or change habits and values.' 3 The late
Martin Luther King, Jr. said that "[t]he habits, if not the hearts, of people
have been and are being altered every day by legislative acts, judicial deci-

215. WALD.supra note 200, at38. The religious institutions themselves bear some of the responsibility
for their absence from the public arena, as many withdrew for doctrinal reasons. NEUHAUS, supra note
189, at 37.
216. NEUHAUS. supra note 189, at 37.
217. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 413 (1963) (Stewart, J., concurring in the result).
218. James Madison, Memorial and Remonstrance, in JAMES MADISON ON RELIGIOUS LIBERTY, supra
note 28, at 55-60.
219. Id
220. CHARLES B. SANFORD, THE RELIGIOUS LmE OF THOMAS JEPFERSON 37, 51 (1984) (citing letter
from Thomas Jefferson to James Fishback (1809)).
221. BORK,supra note 207, at 249 (citing to LORD PATRICK DEvLN, THE ENFORCEMENT OF MORALS).
222. Id
223. WILL, supra note 200, at 20-21.
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sions, and executive orders."' Those moral beliefs which become actionguiding rules are rooted in the community's experience over time, rather than
individual choices.'
In a democratic society, both the government and society must draw
from the same understanding of morality, or risk government
deligitimation.' That which Professor Fuller called the morality of duty,
which is embodied within the law, "lays down the basic rules without which
an ordered society is impossible, or without which an ordered society directed toward certain specific goals must fail of its mark."' Religion, then,
has a part in providing a moral definition both to the society and to the nation.'
Yet the judiciary has increasingly called into question the
community's right or ability to make moral judgments.'
Laws in and of themselves will not ensure maintenance of community
standards and personal liberties in a self-governing society. In such a society,
the effectiveness of law depends primarily on voluntary compliance.'
Thus members of that community must have an internal morality which
guides their behavior. John Adams understood this when he said that our
Constitution "was made only for a moral and religious people. It is wholly
inadequate to the government of any other."'" Consistent with Adams' reasoning, a recent survey revealed that at least two-thirds of the population believes that religion holds the answer to many contemporary problems. '
Religion's "unique function in society" is much the same today as in the
founders' time: religious teaching is where most people learn such basic
values as honesty, hard work, and concern for others necessary to maintain a
democratic government. "3
The majority of people derive their moral values from their religious
traditions and teachings.' More specifically, religion is often viewed as

224. This statement quoted in GLENDON, supra note 201, at 105.
225. PERRY, supra note 190, at 29-37.
226. NEUHAUS, supra note 189, at 82. The Court recognized this principle in Bowers v. Hardwick, 478
U.S. 186 (1986), when it held that the moral judgment of the electorate was a sufficiently valid reason for
upholding Georgia's anti-sodomy law. The Court rejected the principle in Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113
(1973), and touched off a polarized, sometimes violent, debate in society.
227. FULLER, supra note 210, at 5-6, 30 ("It is the morality of the Old Testament and the Ten Commandments ... it condemns [men] for failing to respect the basic requirements of social living.").
228. NLwHAus, supra note 189, at 76-77.
229. BoRK, supra note 207, at 248.
230. Howard, supra note 20, at 521 (quoting ARCHIBALD Cox, THE COURT AND THE CONSTIUILON
13-14 (1987)).
231. This statement is quoted in BERmAN, supra note 14, at 234.
232. Joel Kotkin. Brave New World, L.A. ThmES MAG., Jan. 17. 1993, at 18.
233. Maddigan, supra note 10, at 304, 308.
234. BORiC, supra note 207, at 248 ("Religion is regarded by most Americans as the sole or primary
source of moral belief.").
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the motivating force for good behavior. 5 One government survey on the
problem of youth crime recognized the vital role religious institutions can
play in developing moral values and combating crime in society:
The important contribution churches, synagogues, and other religious institutions can make to crime prevention is evident. They
are the leading exponents and guardians of the community's moral
and ethical standards. They have the ability to understand and
teach in their largest context the great principles of honesty and
honor, of compassion and charity, of respect and reverence that
underlie not only the Nation's laws but its entire being. They have
the power to move men's spirits and sway their minds.2"
The study noted the positive role of religious institutions, yet also recognized
that "limited resources and restrictive policies" have limited their effectiveness. 7 One recommendation for improvement included increasing the involvement of religious institutions,"3 yet any such effort would likely be
challenged on Establishment Clause grounds.
While the state does not have a secular interest in promoting religion, it
does have an interest in promoting healthy social behavior. 9 Studies show
a lower incidence of drug and alcohol abuse, teen pregnancy, and suicide
among religious adherents. 2' Despite controversy over his racial views and
statements, Louis Farrakhan's Nation of Islam has successfully worked to
combat violence and drug-related crime in inner city neighborhoods."1 Interestingly, media accounts discuss his "ideology"--but ignore the religious
aspect of the black Muslim sect which is a "force for good" in crime-ravaged
neighborhoods.' 2
One lesson of history is that there is "no significant example ...

of a

society successfully maintaining moral life without the aid of religion."' 3
With schools especially fearful of teaching, or even reinforcing, moral values
lest they cross the line of establishment, the "obvious lack of values is having the most miserable consequences."' 2 One study correlating the crime
235.

NEuHAus, supra note 189, at 22.

236. THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY, A REPORT BY THE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION OF
LAw ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF JuSTICE 647 (1968).
237. Id at 193.
238. Id. at 194.
239. Gary L. Bauer, Why Engel Should Be Overturned, PuB. PERSP., Mar.-Apr. 1992, at 11-12; Wn.
supra note 200, at 77.
240. Bauer, supra note 239. Students at religious schools also show a higher rate of performance than
those in public schools on standardized testing and overall scholastic achievement. DAVID BARTON, To
PRAY OR NOT TO PRAY 54-65 (6th ed. 1991).
241. Farrakhan'sMission, NEWswEEK, Mar. 19, 1990, at 25, 25.
242. Id
243. WILL DuRANT & ARIEL DuRANT, THE LESSONS OF HISTORY 51 (1968).
244. Kathleen Kennedy Townsend, Not Just Read and Write, but Right and Wrong; Our Schools Need
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rate to both economic conditions and periods of religious revival found that
periods of economic upheaval such as the industrial revolution and urbanization of the mid-1800s and poverty such as the Great Depression did not
result in marked increases in crime.' Instead, the religious revivals of the
second Great Awakening and the Sunday School movements had a common
element of character-building focused on establishing a moral consensus, and
a by-product was a steady or reduced crime rate, even during periods of
social upheaval.'
C. The Erosion of Religion as a Moral (and Political)Base
Western civilization is for the most part derived from both the JudeoChristian religious tradition and the Greek tradition of rational thought and
artistic creativity.' More specifically, American culture and the government structure are based on covenant theology-the concept that God (or the
government) and the people are bound by a covenant of mutual obligations.'
Biblical principles guided the drafters of the various state
constitutions,' 9 and their experience in turn guided the drafters of the federal constitution.' The structure of the government-three coequal branches-reflected Madison's vision of institutional interaction whereby potential
rivals "see one another as reciprocally connected fellow citizens," who work
out their differences based on respect for mutual equality.5 Thus the
founding concepts of freedom and justice are rooted primarily in Christian
belief 52
As noted above, religion was viewed as the motivating force for good
behavior, and the public ethic was derived from a religious common denominator. Even unbelievers acknowledged, and accepted, the influence of religious values on societal behavior 5 3 A more recent development has been
the conscious divorce of the public ethic from religious belief' The influential players in public life-government leaders, lawmakers, educators, and

to Teach Values, Too, WASH. MONTHLY, Jan. 1990, at 30, 34.
245. James Q. Wilson, Crime and American Culture, PUB. INTEREST, Winter 1983, at 22, 22-28.
246. Id. at 28-32.
247. HrrtcocK,supra note 19, at 19.
248. WALD, supra note 200, at 42-57; Richard B. Morris, The Judeo-Christian Foundation of the
American PoliticalSystem, in JAMES MADISON ON RELIGIOUS LIBERTY, supra note 28, at 112-13. Tracing
the references in public political literature of the founding era, one commentator found that the Bible was
the most frequently cited source. DONALD S. LurL, THE ORIGINS OF AMERCAN CONSTrTUTIONALISM 140
(1988).
249. LuTz, supra note 248, at 142.
250. Id at 138.
251. BuRT, supra note 21, at 96.
252. HuNTER, supra note 11, at 8.
253. 1 TOCQUEV.LE, supra note 39, at 324.
254. NEUHAUS, supra note 189, at 22.
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the media--"systematically marginalize religious viewpoints relative to secular ones."2" This is done by confining religious belief to the private sphere,
treating it as a mere hobby.' But a hobby does not have the moral force
necessary to sustain a major social movement, such as the civil rights movement" 7 or impact the moral climate of the general community.
Religion is at the heart of a culture, not only in those beliefs and activities which are obviously religious, but also in the ways people think and
react to what they believe to be ultimately true and important." From the

earliest days of the colonial era until "well into the twentieth century," mainline Protestant beliefs formed the cultural center of American society until
that consensus collapsed only a generation ago.' This cultural continuity
held society together even through periods of rapid social change.' Yet
due to an interpretation of the First Amendment which has come to mean the
separation of religion and religiously-based morality from the public debate,
the religious voice in the public space is increasingly suspect." But as Justice Jackson observed: 'The fact is that, for good or for ill, nearly everything
in our culture worth transmitting, everything which gives meaning to life, is
saturated with religious influences, derived from paganism, Judaism, Christianity-both Catholic and Protestant-and other faiths accepted by a large
part of the world's peoples."'
The challenge to our moral traditions and social values and institutions
begun in the early 1960s has resulted in a "state of increasing moral confusion and social anarchy." 2' With increased pluralism and growing doubt
about traditional religions, we have been "forced into making law our ultimate morality and religion."'2 Where people once turned to their religion
for answers, they now turn to the law with questions involving social, moral,
and ethical considerations, as well as for answers to many of the old problems which were not previously perceived as legal issues.' People seek
solutions, security, and the vindication of their "rights" in the courts of our
increasingly litigious society.' Yet with little consensus as to what is right
255.
256.

Frederick Mark Gedicks, Public Life and Hostility to Religion, 78 VA. L. REV. 671, 672 & n.5.
CARTER supra note 34, at 23-43; see also Gedicks, supra note 255, at 679 ("Religion, rather than

being abolished, becomes a private whim, an expression of purely subjective, individualized values....
257. CARTER, supra note 34, at 227-29; NEUHAUS, supra note 189, at 103.
258. NEuHAus, supra note 189, at 27.
259. Neuhaus, supra note 15, at 121; ROBERT N. BEuLAH ET AL., HABrrS oF THE HEART 237 (1985).
260. BELLAH Er AL., supra note 259, at 155.
261. NEuHAUS , supra note 189, at 25; see also Smith, supra note 5, at 149-50.
262.
263.
264.
(1980).
265.
CER L.
266.

McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203, 236 (1948) (Jackson, J., concurring).
AMATAI ETZIoNI, THE SPIRIT OF CoMMuNIrY 12 (1993).
Sanford Levinson & Robert N. Bellah, Law as Our Civil Religion, 31 MERCER L. REv. 477, 483
Lois G. Forer, Some Problems in the Administration ofJustice in a Secularized Society, 31 MERREv. 448, 449 (1980).
NEUHAus, supra note 189, at 249.

UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA JOURNAL OF LAW & PUBLIC POLICY[

[Vol. 6

or wrong, there is "widespread dissatisfaction with the law in the administration of justice."' 7
Court decisions which privatize religion and school texts which ignore
the nation's religious history send a message that religion is not relevant to
public life.' Rather than fostering neutrality, the Court's rulings have produced hostility to religious beliefs and devalued the positive effects of religion on society.' Modern theorists assume that religion, while admitting
its importance in times past, cannot provide the necessary social cohesion for
a modern secular society."' In a secularized society, ideas of what is "morally excellent or morally base" cannot not be publicly discussed as a moral
judgment, because there is no appeal beyond the individual. Yet the conflict
is not so much between morality and secularism, but instead is a "conflict of
moralities in which one system calls itself secular and insists that the other
do likewise as the price of admission to the public arena.""
Churches can provide a sense of community and a counter-balance to the
extremes of individualism and relativism. People routinely turn to religion for
the moral rules and guidelines which are missing in a society that makes
every individual the arbiter of right and wrong." 2 But the prohibition of
voluntary religious observances in public is indicative of a "steady withdrawal of the law from concern with the citizenry's state of mind."273 One of the
effects of marginalized religion is the loss of one of the most important cultivating elements of both individual and community identity.7 4
D. Elevation of the Individual over Society
Individualism has long been a hallmark American characteristic."' Yet
it was previously tempered by one's obligations to the society. Biblical individualism views the individual in relation to the community in which he
lives, and thus individualism coexisted with Biblical religion and classical
republicanism." Participation in a church community reminds individuals
of their need for others and the interdependence of society.' Modern individualism, which grew out of the social upheavals of the 1960s, is reflected

267. Forer, supra note 265, at 450.
268. WALD, supra note 200, at 3-5 (according to modernization theory, the forces of modernity undermine the "myths and traditions" of religious influence); Bauer, supra note 239, at 11.
269. BORK, supra note 207, at 247; Choper, supra note 76, at 688; see also Bauer, supra note 239, at
11.
270. NEUHAUS, supra note 189, at 95.
271. Id. at 126.
272. WALD, supra note 200, at 18.
273. WIL, supra note 200, at 71.
274. HARRINGTON, supra note 198, at 8.
275. GLENDON, supra note 201, at 3; 1 TOCQuEVnL, supra note 39, at 57-60.
276. BELLAH ET AL., supra note 259, at 143.
277. Id. at 247; see also 2 TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 39, at 23.
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in the "right" to do anything the individual wants to do."' This in turn is
producing a "way of life that is neither individually or socially viable"'
because it isolates people and undermines the conditions of freedom.'
One of the more disruptive features of modem individualism is the insistence on framing individual rights as absolute, with no corresponding social
or civil responsibilities."8 A recent People for the American Way survey of
young Americans revealed a "troubling mismatch of rights and responsibilities,"' 2 and an emphasis on "freedom and license almost to the complete
exclusion of service or participation."' This weakened sense of individual
obligation to the community has led to an increased tendency to project
responsibility onto the government. 2 Yet as even Congress and the Court
have recognized, government is not the most efficient provider of social
services.'
By framing issues as absolute rights, further moral debate is shut off, as
is the "rational political discourse" which could lead to consensus, accommodation, or the discovery of common ground.' As Professor Glendon has
observed, careless talk about rights invites the failures of both cheapening or

betraying the very rights being discussed, and foreclosing dialogue with
others whose opinions differ.' As a person pursues his own individual interests, he becomes insulated from the larger community,'" and loses any
sense of external responsibility. Professor Fuller's "invisible pointer" between
the moralities of duty and aspiration' is pressed ever lower in the vain ef-

278. HnrcHcocK, supra note 19, at 66 ("Whatever or whoever tries to tell me what to do is oppressing
me. Any law, any institution, any figure of authority which I have not created myself is my enemy, an
unjust oppressor of my liberty."). This attitude becomes most destructive when adopted by the criminal
element of society. An Atlanta detective described the attitude of caijackers in terms chillingly similar to
the 1960s individualist supra: "'heywant to do what they want to do, and they don't want anyone to tell
them what to do." Kathy Scruggs & Jack Warner, Danger on the Streets, A71ANTA CONST., Jan. 2, 1994,
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fort to achieve a value-free society.'
The observations of the nineteenth-century visitor Alexis de Tocqueville
are still relevant. In Democracy in America, he questioned whether political
freedom can exist independent of religious belief."' The chief advantage of
religion is to draw man away from the contemplation of himself, and impose
on him some duty toward others.' One common example of that duty is
the Golden Rule-that principal of reciprocity which holds that one should
treat others the way one expects to be treated. 3 A "golden rule" is common to most religions and cultures, sometimes expressed in the positive, although more often in negative form.' The reciprocity implicit in covenant
theology and the Golden Rule, and the mutual interaction at the heart of our
governmental structure, require more of the citizenry than the pursuit of selfinterest.
E. Undermining the Law
A number of studies describing the breakdown of the social fabric in
modern America indicate that the 1960s marked the turning point.' Various indicators such as academic scores, teen pregnancy, the divorce rate, and
violent crime have all shown a worsening trend in the past three decades.'
In addition, no amount of government spending on social and poverty pro-

grams, increased prison space and mandatory minimum sentencing, or innovative policing techniques has slowed the upward spiral of violent crime.'

The area of criminal law is one where the need for a concept of internal
morality is most evident.'

Indeed, criminal law traditionally was and is "a

290. NEUHAUS, supra note 189, at 125; WILL, supra note 200, at 81-82.
291. 2 TocQuEvIlLE, supra note 39, at 23.
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293. Luke 6:31; see also WALTER LIPPMANN, THE GOOD SocIETY 376 (1937).
294. LIPPMANN, supra note 293, at 376-77 (discussion of the rule in other doctrines). It is a "moral
maxim which establishes itself when men recognize others as autonomous persons." d at 377.
295. See, e.g., DAVID BARTON, THE MYtH OF SEPARA7TON 210 (3d ed. 1992); Wilson, supra note 245,
at 22; Violence in America, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP.. Jan. 17, 1994, at 22, 26; Whitehead, supra note
199, at 50, 77.
296. BARTON. supra note 240. Using government numbers, Barton graphed SAT scores, teen pregnancy
rates, violent crime statistics, and a number of other social indicators from the mid-1950s through the late
1980s. The graphs show a marked break beginning in the mid-1960s from statistics which had been relatively steady. The break point on these graphs was the Supreme Court decisions on school prayer (Engel)
in 1962 and Bible reading (Schempp) in 1963. Id. As this article has endeavored to show, these decisions
are symptomatic of an overall trend of the Court and societal leadership toward marginalizing the place of
religion in American life. Thirty years later, these decisions (particularly Engel) still have not been accepted by the general population. See, e.g., Religion in the Public Square, PUB. PE.SP.. Mar.-Apr. 1992, at 14,
16 (opinion poll results); Chris Burritt, Holy Wars Waged in Schools as Prayer, Religion Return, ATLANTA CONST., Mar. 20, 1994, at Al, A16 (describing efforts to return prayer to public schools).
297. Violence in America, supra note 295, at 24.
298. BERMAN, supra note 14, at 215-16.

MARGINAIZING RELIGION

repository of moral norms."' If laws were sufficient, society should be
safer now than ever, since Congress has passed a new crime bill in every
two-year session except the last one." As political commentator George
Will observed, "[Tihe criminal class has not been impressed." '' Instead,
what deters crime is a citizenry with a law-abiding tradition, which is derived
from a concept of law as more than just rules backed by coercive sanctions
as an instrument of secular policy.'
Obedience to law is gained more effectively by factors such as "trust,
fairness, credibility, and affiliation,"'
and a "conviction that law is...
also part of the ultimate purpose and meaning of life."' Laws which do
not seem to be "coherently related to basic presuppositions about right and
wrong, good and evil.., will be condemned as illegitimate."'
Laws
which are nothing more than what judges say they are also risk being considered illegitimate because there is an element of capriciousness, a concept
which violates Fuller's internal morality of legislation.' Courts cannot disagree with a community decision of what constitutes acceptable behavior
"except by saying that the judges' morality is superior to that the majority of
the citizenry,"' a concept which many people will not accept because it is
repugnant to the idea of democracy.
With the rising emphasis on individual "rights," people have come to feel
that obeying the law is just a personal choice, or that it does not apply to
them.' As the influence of the religious doctrines of moral responsibility
and free will declined, society lost the philosophic and common sense bases
of responsibility before the law.' People no longer understand the tradition
of moral legitimation, or the reasons why they ought to do what the various
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307. BOP,, supra note 207, at 123. While many reject judicial legislation as elitist, overreaching and
antimajoritarian not to mention a usurpation of the legislature's function, others view it with approval:

The nine judges on the Supreme Court, being immune to political reprisal since they serve
for life, may be performing a significant though quite controversial function; they may be
compelling the people to accept what the judges think is good for them but which they
would not accept from elected legislators.
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308. JAMEs LINCOLN COLLIER, THE RISE OF SELFISHNESS IN AMERICA 259 (1991). Millions hold the
opinion that they have a "constitutional right to break the law." Id. at 258.
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laws and procedures require."' One judge described feeling like a "blackrobed priest performing the rites of a dying faith" because there is so little
faith in the law among the people she sees in court."' As courts continue
to systematically overrule as irrelevant the moral traditions from which Western law has developed, and which for the majority still provide their basic
sense of right and wrong, the crisis of legitimacy which has developed will
continue to deepen.312
V. CONCLUSION

The breakdown of civil society in modern America roughly parallels the
"radical separation of law and religion;" 31 3 without a religiously-influenced
citizenry, the law holds no moral force. Jefferson, so often quoted for the
"wall of separation" metaphor, also stated that "the liberties of a nation [cannot] be thought secure when we remove their only firm basis, a firm conviction in the minds of the people that their liberties are the gift of God. 31 4
However, courts no longer recognize the theological basis behind our system
of government and our laws-indeed that religious basis is suspect-and
people tend to believe that their liberties are secured by the judicial system.
The concept of mutual respect and reciprocal duties implicit in the Golden Rule, which is common to virtually all faiths, is missing in today's society. In its place is a self-absorbed focus on individual rights, and an intolerance for the rights of others if they happen to conflict. Absolute rights are
played as a trump card, foreclosing moral debate and mutual accommodation.
Underlying this insulating individualism are a series of Supreme Court decisions which have sent a message that only the secular is permitted as a rationale for laws and conduct, unless the moral and religious just happens to fall
in line behind it. Yet if the law's rationale can be questioned, its content is
suspect as well. It is a matter of "common sense and common prudence for a
secular government not to put itself unnecessarily at odds with the religious
sensibilities of its citizenry."3 "
As numerous commentators, and even some of the Justices have noted,
religion has a positive effect on society. It enhances a sense of community,
and gives a point of reference outside of the individual. It encourages con-

310. NEUHAUS, supra note 189, at 176, 248; see also HARRINOTON, supra note 198, at 207-08 (in a
society in which 'legitimacy is no longer cloaked in the aura of God, why obey the law?"). Neuhaus and
Harrington both note that the enlightened secularists have no answers. NEUHAUS, supra note 189, at 2501; HARRINGTON, supra note 198, at 209.
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cern for others, and is the foundation for that inner sense of morality so
important for a law-abiding citizenry. Most of the important social movements have been based in religious communities. Rather than accede to the
demands of those intolerant of religious expression, the Court should formulate a jurisprudence more in line with the original concept of the First
Amendment, which is to maximize and encourage religious liberty. Those
who insist that religion should be completely private show a "lamentable
ignorance of history, sociology, and psychology."3 6
A jurisprudence which views the two religion clauses as complementary
rather than contradictory would help bring judicial interpretation back in line
with the original meaning. One clause should not be used to defeat the other.
Religious groups which exercise their right to offer social services should be
able to do so freely, on the same basis as secular groups providing similar
services, without an establishment jurisprudence which discriminates against
them. The focus should be on the nature of the service provided instead of
on the nature of the provider. Rather than marginalize religious influence, or
restrict it to the private sphere, the Court should recognize the valuable and
unique role religious communities have played, and can play, both in our
national heritage and in building a moral foundation in today's modern society.
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